## 1NC – The CP

#### Text: The United States federal government should establish a sufficient incentive modeled after the Green Community Tax Credit Program for Mexico’s state governments, local governments, and individual land owners that agree to renewable energy development on land over which they have jurisdiction. We’ll clarify.

#### They’d say yes. Solves the aff and doesn’t link to politics

**Rule ‘11**

[Troy. Prof Law at the University of Missouri, PhD University of Chicago. “Renewable Energy and the Neighbors” University of Utah Law Review, N4. December 2011. SocialScienceResearchNetwork//GBS-JV]

C. Additional Advantages of a Tax Credit Approach A Green Community Tax Credit program would accelerate the adoption of local land use policies that facilitate distributed renewable energy development. It would also be relatively invulnerable to political resistance, allow greater Tieboutian sorting among the citizenry, and ensure that unique local costs received adequate attention in the decision-making process. Although it would be far from perfect, a tax credit approach would respect local autonomy while strengthening the incentive for communities to amend their regulations when socially optimal to do so. The following are two additional benefits of using tax credits in this context. 1. Promotion of Sustainability Norms A system of Green Community Tax Credits would leverage the power of social norms in support of sustainability. Sustainability has enjoyed an increasingly prominent role in popular culture in recent years, and some landowners have even come to view distributed renewables as an “environmental fashion statement.” Such positive social norms are indispensable to the sustainability movement, enabling producers of distributed renewables to achieve greater economies of scale and persuading more citizens to go green. Although recent studies suggest that landowners’ resistance to renewable energy development is decreasing, many landowners still fear the potential impacts of distributed renewables on their neighborhoods. A Green Community Tax Credit system would give public recognition to participating “Green Communities,” put pressure on other localities to accommodate distributed renewables, and help to mitigate landowner concerns regarding the devices. For similar reasons, a Green Community Tax Credit program could also reduce opposition from individual neighbors in neighborhoods with Green Community status by strengthening intra-community norms in favor of distributed renewables. A landowner whose city council or homeowner association has already officially adopted “Green Community” policies, and who is receiving consequent tax benefits, is relatively less likely to actively oppose a neighbor’s proposed wind turbine or solar panel.

#### The internal net benefit’s localism – an innovative and local approach to renewable energy development is key to sustainable development – incorporation of the affirmative’s “one size fits all” approach sparks backlash and turns the case

**Rule ‘11**

[Troy. Prof Law at the University of Missouri, PhD University of Chicago. “Renewable Energy and the Neighbors” University of Utah Law Review, N4. December 2011. SocialScienceResearchNetwork//GBS-JV]

D. Green LULUs: Homevoter-Feared Sustainability A third set of sustainable land use policies are particularly susceptible to resistance to local resistance. Rather than enhancing a community's property values or public image, these policies require neighborhoods to accommodate land uses that they have historically opposed. Many landowners view distributed renewable energy devices as locally undesirable land uses (LULUs). n59 State and federal programs aggressively promote distributed renewables, yet local land use restrictions across the nation have long inhibited their installation. n60 Such opposition undermines federal and state efforts to promote sustainability, arguably imposing costs on the nation and the world. n61 Despite the numerous advantages of distributed renewables, these "green" LULUs commonly attract neighborhood opposition because of a perception that they could impose local costs in excess of the local benefits they would provide. n62 Communities have restricted the installation of distributed renewables on countless [\*1236] occasions based on fears that the devices could diminish neighborhood aesthetics, disturb nearby landowners, or threaten property values. n63 An ordinance that invites distributed renewables into a municipality can arguably create greater uncertainty for local voters than an ordinance authorizing the siting of a single waste disposal site or power plant. Unlike large-scale, concentrated LULUs, distributed renewables are typically installed at unpredictable locations throughout host communities over time. Individual voters considering whether their town should host a large LULU often already know where it would be sited and thus may have greater certainty about how it could impact them. In contrast, distributed renewables-friendly ordinances create the risk that any resident could ultimately see a small wind turbine or unsightly solar panel array installed next door. n64 Such broadly distributed risk can make it particularly difficult to build local support for land use controls favoring these devices. n65 The following subsections discuss small wind turbines and solar panels - two common examples of green LULUs. [\*1237] 1. Small Wind Turbines Small wind turbines are an increasingly popular renewable energy source in the United States. n66 In contrast to their commercial-scale counterparts, small wind energy systems convert the kinetic energy in wind into electrical power that is typically consumed on-site. n67 Distributed wind energy development has distinctive characteristics that make it an attractive source of alternative energy. Unlike industrial-scale wind energy projects, small wind turbine installations do not require the construction of costly access roads and transmission lines across vast stretches of rural land and thus pose less of a threat to wildlife and conservation areas. n68 Small wind turbines also diversify a region's renewable energy portfolio in ways that can ease pressure on utility grids because they often generate the most power during periods when solar panels are the least productive. n69 Government incentive programs and improved turbine technologies have catalyzed dramatic growth in small wind turbine installations in recent years. n70 Congress' recent extension of a 30% federal tax credit for small turbines through the end of 2016 n71 suggests that community officials will see a growing number of requests for their installation for several years to come. n72 [\*1238] Unfortunately, despite aggressive government incentives for small wind turbines, local land use restrictions often discourage installation of the devices. n73 Local height restrictions are perhaps the most common obstacle to small wind turbine installations. n74 Height restrictions place limits on the permitted height of any building or structure erected within a zone or jurisdiction. n75 Municipalities and homeowner associations have imposed height restrictions for decades to promote [\*1239] fire safety, n76 and to preserve light, air, and a rural ambiance. n77 Small wind turbines often must rise well above surrounding buildings and trees to be effective, necessitating heights that exceed local height restrictions, n78 and can potentially damage a community's aesthetic appeal. n79 Turbines have also been accused of creating safety hazards, n80 noise, n81 or flicker effects n82 that can annoy neighbors and depress surrounding property values. [\*1240] For these and other reasons, land use regulations in many communities directly or indirectly restrict or prohibit small wind turbine installations within their jurisdiction. n83 Even when local zoning and subdivision covenants are silent as to small turbines, landowners' uncertainty over whether local authorities will challenge the turbines can still deter their installation. n84 2. Solar Energy Systems Photovoltaic solar panels and other solar energy systems are also an important means of generating renewable energy. Rooftop and ground-mounted solar panels [\*1241] convert the radiant energy in sunlight into electric power. n85 Given the myriad benefits of solar energy development, it is not surprising that new solar panel installations are eligible for many of the same federal tax credits and other incentive programs that apply to small wind turbines. n86 Solar energy systems offer the unique benefit of being most productive on hot, sunny days when consumers are using air conditioning systems and utility grid demands are near their peak. n87 The distributed nature of rooftop solar development also curbs energy sprawl, enabling renewable energy development without the need for new transmission lines through pristine rural areas. n88 However, some landowners view solar energy systems as disruptive to neighborhood aesthetics or as threats to surrounding property values. Aware of popular objections to solar panels, numerous homeowner associations n89 and local governments n90 have adopted provisions that prohibit or severely restrict installation of the devices. [\*1242] III. Accommodating Distributed Renewables: Existing Approaches In spite of state and federal policies aimed at promoting distributed renewable energy, local land use regulations continue to deter many landowners from installing small wind turbines and solar panels. n91 A handful of communities have voluntarily adopted provisions that accommodate these green LULUs, n92 but most have proven reluctant to do so. Existing state and federal attempts to address communities' reluctance have been either overaggressive or not strong enough to overcome local resistance. The following is a discussion of the merits and deficiencies of several current approaches to combating local resistance to distributed renewable energy, none of which satisfactorily addresses the problem. A. Deference to Community Governments Most state governments have done relatively little to address local barriers to distributed renewables. Their "hands-off" approach may preserve the autonomy of local governments, but it also fails to motivate communities to accommodate distributed renewables in their land use policies. Persuading communities to revise their land use controls to allow for distributed renewables is politically challenging because it requires local landowners to relinquish valuable rights relating to their properties. Zoning ordinances and subdivision covenants give landowners exclusion rights in common airspace, rooftops, and other areas within a local jurisdiction, protecting against countless risks by restricting activities on nearby parcels. n93 Landowners are prone to resist forfeiting these exclusion rights without receiving something in return. A stylized example illustrates this problem. Suppose the developer of the fictional, fifty-lot residential subdivision of Green Acres had recorded a height restriction covenant against the subdivision property years ago. The covenant prohibited lot owners from erecting any structure that extended more than thirty- [\*1243] five feet above a lot's surface. By virtue of the covenant, the lot owners in the subdivision had each relinquished their common law property rights to occupy all usable airspace situated more than thirty-five feet above their respective lots. n94 In return, each owner received rights to prevent the other forty-nine lot owners from occupying corresponding airspace above their properties. n95 This sort of reciprocal arrangement, which has been repeated in thousands of subdivision covenants throughout the country, theoretically benefits all lot owners in Green Acres. Each owner voluntarily agreed to be subject to the covenant by purchasing a lot within the subdivision, so presumably most of the landowners prefer the covenant arrangement. The covenant spares landowners from having to negotiate and obtain covenants from each of their forty-nine different neighbors to protect their enjoyment of the neighborhood's views and aesthetic qualities. n96 Unfortunately, restrictions in subdivision covenants can also result in the underuse of community resources. One could argue that the height restriction covenant encumbering Green Acres creates a sort of "anticommons" - a regime in which each lot owner "owns a right to exclude, and consequently for which no one owns a privilege of entry and use." n97 If any lot owner in Green Acres sought to construct improvements rising above thirty-five feet, any other owner would have standing to enforce the subdivision covenant and preclude the construction. [\*1244] Professor Michael Heller famously observed that such anticommons property tends to be underutilized because of the great difficulty of obtaining requisite permissions for its use. n98 As it relates to small wind turbines, the airspace burdened by height restrictions can potentially be vulnerable to this problem. Suppose that the Green Acres Homeowner Association was to consider amending its subdivision covenants to exempt small wind turbines from the subdivision's height restriction. Suppose further that if the amendment were approved, five lot owners within the subdivision would install small turbines and save a combined total of $ 5,000 in electricity bills, after accounting for the costs of the turbines and their installation. However, the turbines would create noise, aesthetic impacts, and a risk of future turbine installations that imposed aggregate losses of $ 4,000 on the other forty-five lot owners. If transaction costs were sufficiently low, the five landowners hoping to install turbines would reach Coasean bargains with the other forty-five owners by offering to compensate each neighbor for the expected loss in exchange for their permission to install the five turbines. n99 These five landowners would collectively offer between $ 4,000 and $ 5,000 and the neighbors would accept the offer, generating a Pareto efficient n100 outcome with a $ 1,000 net social benefit. n101 Of course, in reality, successful Coasean bargaining in this context would be highly improbable given the large number of parties involved. n102 Even if the five [\*1245] landowners could request the height restriction amendment through a homeowner association board that could limit collective action problems, the board would likely reject the proposal. Only board members who planned to purchase and install turbines on their own lot would expect to personally benefit from the amendment and would therefore be inclined to support it, and it is unlikely that such members would comprise a majority of the board. The political obstacles to bargaining over restrictions on distributed renewables are more severe in the context of a municipal ordinance than under private covenants. Rights held collectively by residents under zoning restrictions are not "ordinary, property-rule-protected entitlements that [residents] can alienate to any willing buyer or on mutually agreeable terms." n103 As Professor Lee Fennell has noted, zoning-based rights typically "cannot be sold outright" and can only be "bargained over pursuant to an arcane amalgam of legal rules, entrenched local practices, social norms, and political influence." n104 Transfers of such rights usually take the form of variances or special exceptions. n105 Negotiated cash or in-kind payments for a landowner's "purchase" of zoning-based rights from a municipality are essentially development exactions, which are subject to constitutional constraints. n106 B. Vague State Mandates Recognizing the need to do something to prevent local land use controls from deterring small wind and solar energy installations, some state legislatures have enacted statutes that generically instruct localities to accommodate distributed renewables. For instance, a Pennsylvania statute obligates municipalities to develop strategies in their comprehensive plans to "reduce energy consumption and to promote the effective utilization of renewable energy resources." n107 A similar law in Connecticut directs local planning commissions to consider "the objectives of energy-efficient patterns of development [and] the use of solar and [\*1246] other renewable forms of energy and energy conservation" in the planning process. n108 Although these sorts of general statutory directives from state legislatures are surely better than no state-level encouragement at all, such broad language is insufficient to incite substantial change at the local level. Enforcing vague statutory mandates against municipalities can be difficult and expensive because it requires proving the violation of a provision with few or no specific requirements. As a result, many local governments are likely to continue regulating in their own self-interest in the absence of more specific statutory requirements. C. Targeted Community Grants An innovative approach to promoting community acceptance of distributed renewables is to support a select group of municipalities' experimentation with land use policies aimed at encouraging installation of the devices. For example, the United States Department of Energy's Solar America Cities program provides grants to twenty-five metropolitan areas to promote development of solar energy programs and policies. n109 The metropolitan areas selected for the program are also eligible for professional and technical assistance to help them formulate new ways of encouraging solar power at the local level. n110 Formed in 2007, the Solar America Cities program also funds activities aimed at sharing successful local policy strategies with other cities outside of the core group of twenty-five. n111 By focusing its funding on a few pioneer cities, the program could make substantial progress in developing workable policies to promote solar energy in urban and suburban settings. Of course, without special funding, outside cities may have comparatively less of an incentive to accommodate distributed renewables within their boundaries. Thus, while such inventive approaches are highly valuable, additional strategies are necessary to eliminate community barriers to distributed renewables on a broader scale. [\*1247] D. One-Sided Incentive Programs Increasingly in recent years, governments have used subsidies, n112 net metering programs, n113 and other financial initiatives to make distributed renewables a more attractive investment for landowners. While these programs are laudable, they arguably address only one of the two externality problems afflicting green energy development. Distributed renewables create positive externalities - diffused national and global benefits that often are not fully internalized by owners of the devices. n114 Most subsidies and other government incentives seek to address this positive externality problem by reducing landowners' costs of purchasing and installing the devices to encourage more installations. Unfortunately, governments devote far less attention to addressing the negative externality associated with distributed renewables: the costs they can impose on neighbors. As described above, distributed renewables are sometimes perceived to cause aesthetic degradation, noise, flickers, glares, or diminutions in neighboring property values that landowners may not fully consider when deciding whether to install the devices. n115 Neglecting these negative externalities can lead to inefficient, lopsided policies. A numerical example can illustrate the shortcomings of the one-sided incentive approach. Returning to the Green Acres fact pattern from above, n116 suppose that the five lot owners who planned to install small wind turbines upon approval of the height restriction amendment would save only $ 3,000 in energy bills, rather than the previous $ 5,000 amount. The turbines would still impose $ 4,000 in aggregate costs on others within the subdivision but would also generate diffuse, net external benefits for individuals residing outside the community totaling $ 1,500. Under these assumptions, adopting the turbine-friendly covenant amendment would still be a Kaldor-Hicks efficient move, generating a net social benefit of $ 500. n117 However, the community's fifty landowners would be unable to capture the $ 1,500 of global and national benefits resulting from the turbine installations so, within the community, the amendment would generate a $ 1,000 net loss. Even if the transaction costs of Coasean bargaining among the fifty lot owners were zero, the height restriction amendment would not pass. In an effort to correct the market failure created by this positive externality problem, Congress could offer a $ 300 Pigouvian subsidy to each of the five lot owners who installed small wind turbines. n118 The aggregate net benefit to those [\*1248] owners would increase to $ 4,500, n119 exceeding the aggregate $ 4,000 loss imposed on their neighbors. If transaction costs among Green Acres lot owners were sufficiently low, Coasean bargaining would occur: the five would-be turbine installers would successfully negotiate for a subdivision covenant amendment with their forty-five neighbors and would install the turbines. n120 Unfortunately, collective action problems would likely still impede bargaining among the fifty landowners in Green Acres and the amendment proposal would likely fail. n121 By offering the full amount of the Pigouvian subsidy solely to the five turbine-installing landowners to address the positive externalities associated with renewable energy, Congress failed to address the negative externalities the turbines would impose on neighbors. n122 State and federal programs aimed solely at rewarding landowners who install distributed renewables on their properties will be of limited effectiveness until policymakers confront the community-level negative externalities arising from such installations. E. Preemption of Local Regulations The most aggressive means for states or the federal government to counter community resistance to distributed renewables is to invalidate local restrictions [\*1249] that stand in their way. Because most municipalities derive their land use authority from the state, n123 state governments often have the power to preempt local regulations in order to advance statewide objectives. State governments can similarly invalidate private subdivision covenant provisions on public policy grounds. n124 Some researchers advocate the preemption of local land use regulations as the best strategy for overcoming neighborhood resistance to distributed renewables. n125 State or federal government authorities have already used preemption to combat local opposition to the siting of cell towers, n126 group homes, n127 waste disposal sites, n128 and myriad other LULUs. States have even defeated local resistance to large-scale wind energy projects based on their preemption power. n129 A growing number of states have enacted laws invalidating local land use ordinances that hinder renewable energy. A Florida law prohibits local governing bodies in that state from adopting any ordinance that "prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting the installation of solar collectors, clotheslines, or other energy devices [\*1250] based on renewable resources." n130 Statutes enacted in California, n131 Delaware, n132 Indiana, n133 Nevada, n134 New Hampshire, n135 Vermont, n136 and Wisconsin n137 similarly limit municipal land use restrictions on solar panels or small wind energy systems. At first glance, preemption might seem an appealing means of removing local roadblocks to green energy once and for all. With an estimated twenty-five thousand local zoning jurisdictions scattered across the United States, the costs and time that would be required to contact and persuade each locality to adopt renewable energy-friendly policies are prohibitive. n138 Even if it were somehow [\*1251] feasible to separately convince each municipality to amend its ordinances, the resulting patchwork of local regulations could create uncertainty and confusion for turbine and solar panel installers. n139 A state law preempting municipal restrictions on distributed renewables amends all applicable ordinances in the state in one fell swoop and creates greater regulatory consistency among local jurisdictions. However, broadly preempting local ordinances to accommodate distributed renewables is an imprecise, one-size-fits-all approach that ignores local issues and concerns. n140 No two neighborhoods are identical. Each has different geographic, topographic, cultural, and socioeconomic characteristics that create unique sets of values, social norms, and problems. Recognizing the vast diversity among local jurisdictions, scholars have long argued that municipal governments are ordinarily better situated to make local land use decisions than their state-level counterparts. n141 Local officials typically reside within the jurisdictions they serve and tend to have a more specialized understanding than state officials of a community's unique characteristics and challenges. n142 State statutes preempting [\*1252] local land use authority are thus prone to inefficiencies from inadequate consideration of localized factors in the policymaking process. State laws invalidating subdivision covenant restrictions on distributed renewables n143 similarly overlook local concerns. Consider the impact of a preemptive state law on the fictional city of Beachtown, a resort community known for its exceptional views and aesthetic appeal. Suppose that the existing ordinances in Beachtown protected the local ambiance by prohibiting structures (including wind turbines) from rising more than thirty-five feet above any parcel's surface, thereby protecting $ 200,000 in total property value premiums within the jurisdiction. If allowing turbines within the municipality would generate only $ 20,000 in aggregate social benefits but would diminish the aggregate value of Beachtown's viewshed by $ 100,000, then a state law preempting the local height restriction to allow wind turbines would generate an $ 80,000 deadweight loss. n144 Decentralized land use regulation mitigates such inefficiencies by empowering community officials with comparatively better information about a proposal's local costs and benefits to make policy decisions. A provision exempting communities from preemption upon a showing of undue hardship might inject some flexibility into a preemption statute but would likely cause additional problems. Such a provision would create incentives for communities to overstate [\*1253] their degree of potential hardship to qualify for exemption and could engender costly intergovernmental disputes over the issue. n145 An all-or-nothing preemption approach also hinders efficient Tieboutian sorting among the citizenry. The famous Tiebout hypothesis suggests that variations in local laws can increase social welfare by allowing citizens to "vote with their feet" in selecting communities to reside in that best suit their own respective preferences. n146 Some citizens would undoubtedly be willing to pay a premium to live away from the sight of renewable energy systems that they deem aesthetically offensive. Others would gladly live in communities that accommodate distributed renewables, particularly if given financial incentives to do so. n147 Localized policymaking on these issues can enhance the social welfare by enabling more citizens to reside in jurisdictions that regulate sustainable land use in ways that mirror their individual preferences.

#### Local food movement is key to small farms

**NEW YORK TIMES 2012** (“Small Farmers Creating a New Business Model as Agriculture Goes Local,” July 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/us/small-scale-farmers-creating-a-new-profit-model.html)

But beyond the familiar mantras about nutrition or reduced fossil fuel use, the movement toward local food is creating a vibrant new economic laboratory for American agriculture. The result, with its growing army of small-scale local farmers, is as much about dollars as dinner: a reworking of old models about how food gets sold and farms get financed, and who gets dirt under their fingernails doing the work.

#### Small farms are key to biodiversity

**ROSSETT 1999** (Peter, Executive Director of Food First, “On the Benefits of Small Farms,” Feb 8, http://www.foodfirst.org/pubs/policybs/pb4.html)

For more than a century, pundits have confidently predicted the demise of the small farm, labeling it as backward, unproductive, and inefficient -- an obstacle to be overcome in the pursuit of economic development. But this is wrong. Far from being stuck in the past, small-farm agriculture provides a productive, efficient, and ecological vision for the future. If small farms are worth preserving, then now is the time to educate the world’s policy-makers about the genuine value of small farm agriculture. Small Farm Productivity How many times have we heard that large farms are more productive than small farms, and that we need to consolidate land holdings to take advantage of that greater productivity and efficiency? The actual data shows the opposite -- small farms produce far more per acre or hectare than large farms. One reason for the low levels of production on large farms is that they tend to be monocultures. The highest yield of a single crop is often obtained by planting it alone on a field. But while that may produce a lot of one crop, it generates nothing else of use to the farmer. In fact, the bare ground between crop rows invites weed infestation. The weeds then invest labor in weeding or money in herbicide. Large farmers tend to plant monocultures because they are the simplest to manage with heavy machinery. Small farmers, especially in the Third World, are much more likely to plant crop mixtures -- intercropping -- where the empty space between the rows is occupied by other crops. They usually combine or rotate crops and livestock, with manure serving to replenish soil fertility. Such integrated farming systems produce far more per unit area than do monocultures. Though the yield per unit area of one crop -- corn, for example -- may be lower on a small farm than on a large monoculture farm, the total production per unit area, often composed of more than a dozen crops and various animal products, can be far higher. This holds true whether we are talking about an industrial country like the United States, or any country in the Third World. Figure 1 shows the relationship between farm size and total production for fifteen countries in the Third World. In all cases, relatively smaller farm sizes are much more productive per unit area -- 200 to 1,000 percent more productive -- than are larger ones. In the United States the smallest farms, those of 27 acres or less, have more than ten times greater dollar output per acre than larger farms. While in the U.S. this is largely because smaller farms tend to specialize in high value crops like vegetables and flowers, it also reflects relatively more attention devoted to the farm, and more diverse farming systems. Small Farms in Economic Development More bushels of grain is not the only goal of most farm production; farm resources must also generate wealth for the overall improvement of rural life -- including better housing, education, health services, transportation, local business diversification, and more recreational and cultural opportunities. Here in the United States, the question was asked more than a half-century ago: what does the growth of large-scale, industrial agriculture mean for rural towns and communities? Walter Goldschmidt’s classic 1940s study of California’s San Joaquin Valley, As You Sow: Three Studies in the Social Consequences of Agribusiness, compared areas dominated by large corporate farms with those still characterized by smaller, family farms. In farming communities dominated by large corporate farms, nearby towns died off. Mechanization meant fewer local people were employed, and absentee ownership meant farm families themselves were no longer to be found. In these corporate-farm towns, the income earned in agriculture was drained off into larger cities to support distant enterprises, while in towns surrounded by family farms, the income circulated among local business establishments, generating jobs and community prosperity. Where family farms predominated, there were more local businesses, paved streets and sidewalks, schools, parks, churches, clubs, and newspapers, better services, higher employment, and more civic participation. Recent studies confirm that Goldschmidt’s findings remain true. If we turn toward the Third World we find similar local benefits to be derived from a small farm economy. The Landless Workers Movement (MST) is a grassroots organization in Brazil that helps landless laborers to organize occupations of idle land belonging to wealthy landlords. When the movement began in the mid-1980s, the mostly conservative mayors of rural towns were violently opposed to MST land occupations in surrounding areas. In recent times, their attitude has changed. Most of their towns are very depressed economically, and occupations can give local economies a much needed boost. Typical occupations consist of 1,000 to 3,000 families, who turn idle land into productive farms. They sell their produce in the marketplaces of the local towns and buy their supplies from local merchants. Not surprisingly those towns with nearby MST settlements are better off economically than other similar towns, and many mayors now actually petition the MST to carry out occupations near their towns. Local and regional economic development benefits from a small farm economy, as do the life and prosperity of rural towns. Can we re-create a small farm economy in places where it has been lost, to improve the well-being of the poor? Recreating a Small Farm Economy Recent history shows that the re-distribution of land to landless and land-poor rural families can be a very effective way to improve rural well-being. We can examine the outcome of every land reform program carried out in the Third World since World War II, being careful to distinguish between genuine land reforms -— when quality land was really distributed to the poor and the power of the rural oligarchy to distort and "capture" policies was broken -- and "fake land reforms" -- when the poor have been relegated to the poorest, most remote soils. In every case of genuine land reform, real, measurable poverty reduction and improvement in human welfare has invariably been the result. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Cuba, and China are all good examples. In contrast, countries with reforms that gave only poor quality land to beneficiaries, and/or failed to alter the rural power structures that work against the poor, failed to make a major dent in rural poverty. Mexico and the Philippines are typical cases of the latter. More recently IBASE, a research center in Brazil, studied the impact on government coffers of legalizing MST-style land occupations cum settlements versus the services used by equal numbers of people migrating to urban areas. When the landless poor occupy land and force the government to legalize their holdings, it implies costs: compensation of the former landowner, legal expenses, credit for the new farmers, and others. Nevertheless the total cost to the state to maintain the same number of people in an urban shanty town -- including the services and infrastructure they use -- exceeds in just one month, the yearly cost of legalizing land occupations. Another way of looking at it is in terms of the cost of creating a new job. Estimates of the cost of creating a job in the commercial sector of Brazil range from two to twenty times more than the cost of establishing an unem-ployed head of household on farm land, through agrarian reform. Land reform beneficiaries in Brazil have an annual income equivalent to 3.7 minimum wages, while still landless laborers average only 0.7 of the minimum. Infant mortality among families of beneficiaries has dropped to only half of the national average. This provides a powerful argument that using land reform to create a small farm economy is not only good for local economic development, but is also more effective social policy than allowing business-as-usual to keep driving the poor out of rural areas and into burgeoning cities. National Economic Development and "Bubble-Up" Economics A relatively equitable small farmer-based rural economy provides the basis for strong national economic development. The post-war experiences of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan demonstrate how equitable land distribution fuels economic development. At the end of the war, circumstances including devastation and foreign occupation, conspired to create the conditions for "radical" land reforms in each country, breaking the eco-nomic stranglehold of the landholding class over rural economies. Combined with trade protection to keep farm prices high, and targeted investment in rural areas, small farmers rapidly achieved a high level of purchasing power, which guaranteed domestic markets for fledging industries. The post-war economic "miracles" of these three countries were each fueled at the start by these internal markets centered in rural areas, long before the much heralded "export orientation" policies which much later on pushed those industries to compete in the global economy. This was real triumph for "bubble-up" economics, in which re-distribution of productive assets to the poorest strata of society created the economic basis for rapid development. It stands in stark contrast to the failure of "trickle down" economics to achieve much of anything in the same time period in areas of U.S. dominance, such as much of Latin America, and to the Asian financial crisis, which happened after many of the original policies had been discontinued. Good Stewards of Natural Resources The benefits of small farms extend into the ecological sphere. Where large, industrial-style farms impose a scorched-earth mentality on resource management-- no trees, no wildlife, endless monocultures -- small farmers can be very effective stewards of natural resources and the soil. To begin with, small farmers utilize a broad array of resources and have a vested interest in their sustainability. Their farming systems are diverse, incorporating and preserving significant functional biodiversity within the farm. By preserving biodiversity, open space, and trees, and by reducing land degradation, small farms provide valuable ecosystem services to the larger society. In the United States, small farmers devote 17 percent of their area to woodlands, compared to only five percent on large farms, and keep nearly twice as much of their land in "soil improving uses," including cover crops and green manures. In the Third World, peasant farmers show a tremendous ability to prevent and even reverse land degradation, including soil erosion. Compared to the ecological wasteland of a modern export plantation, the small farm landscape contains a myriad array of biodiversity. The forested areas from which wild foods and leaf litter are extracted, the wood lot, the farm itself with intercropping, agroforestry, and large and small livestock, the fish pond, the backyard garden, allow for the preservation of hundreds if not thousands of wild and cultivated species. Simultaneously, the commitment of family members to maintaining soil fertility on the family farm means an active interest in long-term sustainability not found on large farms owned by absentee investors. The Small Farm Path To the productive, economic, and environmental benefits of small farm agriculture, we can add the continuance of cultural traditions and of the rural way of life. If we are truly concerned about rural peoples and ecosystems, then the preservation and promotion of small, family farm agriculture is a crucial step we must take.

#### Biodiversity loss causes extinction

**Young 10** – PhD coastal marine ecology, [Ruth, “Biodiversity: what it is and why it’s important”, February 9th, <http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/02/biodiversity/biodiversity-what-and-why/>]

Different species within ecosystems fill particular roles, they all have a function, they all have a niche. They interact with each other and the physical environment to provide ecosystem services that are vital for our survival. For example plant species convert carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and energy from the sun into useful things such as food, medicines and timber. Pollination carried out by insects such as bees enables the [production of ⅓ of our food crops](http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/01/biodiversity/bees-pollination/). Diverse mangrove and coral reef ecosystems provide a wide variety of habitats that are essential for many fishery species. To make it simpler for economists to comprehend the magnitude of services offered by biodiversity, a team of researchers estimated their value – it amounted to $US33 trillion per year. “By protecting biodiversity we maintain ecosystem services” Certain species play a “keystone” role in maintaining ecosystem services. Similar to the removal of a keystone from an arch, the removal of these species can result in the collapse of an ecosystem and the subsequent removal of ecosystem services. The most well known example of this occurred during the 19th century when sea otters were almost hunted to extinction by fur traders along the west coast of the USA. This led to a population explosion in the sea otters’ main source of prey, sea urchins. Because the urchins graze on kelp their booming population decimated the underwater kelp forests. This loss of habitat led to declines in local fish populations. Sea otters are a keystone species once hunted for their fur (Image: Mike Baird) Eventually a treaty protecting sea otters allowed the numbers of otters to increase which inturn controlled the urchin population, leading to the recovery of the kelp forests and fish stocks. In other cases, ecosystem services are maintained by entire functional groups, such as apex predators (See [Jeremy Hance’s post at Mongabay)](http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0202-hance_toppredators.html). During the last 35 years, over fishing of large shark species along the US Atlantic coast has led to a population explosion of skates and rays. These skates and rays eat bay scallops and their out of control population has led to the closure of a century long scallop fishery. These are just two examples demonstrating how biodiversity can maintain the services that ecosystems provide for us, such as fisheries. One could argue that to maintain ecosystem services we don’t need to protect biodiversity but rather, we only need to protect the species and functional groups that fill the keystone roles. However, there are a couple of problems with this idea. First of all, for most ecosystems we don’t know which species are the keystones! Ecosystems are so complex that we are still discovering which species play vital roles in maintaining them. In some cases its groups of species not just one species that are vital for the ecosystem. Second, even if we did complete the enormous task of identifying and protecting all keystone species, what back-up plan would we have if an unforseen event (e.g. pollution or disease) led to the demise of these ‘keystone’ species? Would there be another species to save the day and take over this role? Classifying some species as ‘keystone’ implies that the others are not important. This may lead to the non-keystone species being considered ecologically worthless and subsequently over-exploited. Sometimes we may not even know which species are likely to fill the keystone roles. An example of this was discovered on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. This research examined what would happen to a coral reef if it were over-fished. The “over-fishing” was simulated by fencing off coral bommies thereby excluding and removing fish from them for three years. By the end of the experiment, the reefs had changed from a coral to an algae dominated ecosystem – the coral became overgrown with algae. When the time came to remove the fences the researchers expected herbivorous species of fish like the parrot fish (Scarus spp.) to eat the algae and enable the reef to switch back to a coral dominated ecosystem. But, surprisingly, the shift back to coral was driven by a supposed ‘unimportant’ species – the bat fish (Platax pinnatus). The bat fish was previously thought to feed on invertebrates – small crabs and shrimp, but when offered a big patch of algae it turned into a hungry herbivore – a cow of the sea – grazing the algae in no time. So a fish previously thought to be ‘unimportant’ is actually a keystone species in the recovery of coral reefs overgrown by algae! Who knows how many other species are out there with unknown ecosystem roles! In some cases it’s easy to see who the keystone species are but in many ecosystems seemingly unimportant or redundant species are also capable of changing niches and maintaining ecosystems. The more biodiverse an ecosystem is, the more likely these species will be present and the more resilient an ecosystem is to future impacts. Presently we’re only scratching the surface of understanding the full importance of biodiversity and how it helps maintain ecosystem function. The scope of this task is immense. In the meantime, a wise insurance policy for maintaining ecosystem services would be to conserve biodiversity. In doing so, we increase the chance of maintaining our ecosystem services in the event of future impacts such as disease, invasive species and of course, climate change. This is the international year of biodiversity – a time to recognize that biodiversity makes our survival on this planet possible and that our protection of biodiversity maintains this service.

## 1NC – The K

#### The aff’s framing of energy policy as a question of impacts to avoid obscures the affirmative question of what kind of society we want to build—they cement the hegemony of technological thought and undermine democratic decision making

**WINNER 1989** (Prof of Poli Sci at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, The Whale and the Reactor)

In recent times the idea of recognizing limits upon the growth of certain technologies has experienced something of a revival. Many people are prepared to entertain the notion of limiting a given technology if:

1. Its application threatens public health or safety

2. Its use threatens to exhaust some vital resource

3. It degrades the quality of the environment (air, land, and

water)

4. It threatens natural species and wilderness areas that ought

to be preserved

5. Its application causes social stresses and strains of an exaggerated

kind.

Along with ongoing discussions about ways to sustain economic growth, national competitiveness, and prosperity, these are the only matters of technology assessment that the general public, decision makers, and academicians are prepared to take seriously.

While such concerns are valid, they severely restrict the range of moral and political criteria that are permissible in public deliberations about technological change. Several years ago I tried to register my discomfort on this score with some colleagues in computer science and sociology who were doing a study of the then-novel systems ofelectronic funds transfer (EFT). They had concluded that such systems contained the potential for redistributing financial power in the world of banking. Electronic money would make possible a shift ofpower from smaller banks to large national and international financial institutions. Beyond that it appeared such systems posed serious problems about data protection and individual privacy. They asked me to suggest an effective way of presenting the possible dangers of this development to their audience of scholars and policy makers. I recommended that their research try to show that under conditions of heavy, continued exposure, EFT causes cancer in laboratory animals. Surely, that finding would be cause for concern. My ironic suggestion acknowledged what I take to be the central characteristic of socially acceptable criticism of technology in our time. Unless one can demonstrate conclusively that a particular technical practice will generate some physically evident catastrophe cancer, birth defects, destruction of the ozone layer, or some other-one might as well remain silent.

The conversation about technology and society has continued to a point at which an obvious question needs to be addressed: Are there no shared ends that matter to us any longer other than the desire to be affluent while avoiding the risk of cancer? It may be that the answer is no. The prevailing consensus seems to be that people love a life ofhigh consumption, tremble at the thought that it might end, and are displeased about having to clean up the messes that modern technologies sometimes bring. To argue a moral position convincingly these days requires that one speak to (and not depart from) people's love of material well-being, their fascination with efficiency, or their fear of death. The moral sentiments that hold force can be arrayed on a spectrum ranging from Adam Smith to Frederick W. Taylor to Thomas Hobbes. I do not wish to deny the validity of these sentiments, only to point out that they represent an extremely narrow mindset. Concerns about particular technological hazards are sometimes the beginning of a much broader political awareness. But for the most part we continue to disregard a problem that has been brewing since the earliest days of the industrial revolution-whether our society can establish forms and limits for technological change, forms and limits that derive from a positively articulated idea of what society ought to be.

As a way of beginning that project, I would suggest a simple heuristic exercise. Let us suppose that every political philosophy in a given time implies a technology or set of technologies in a particular pattern for its realization. And let us recognize that every technology of significance to us implies a set of political commitments that can be identified if one looks carefully enough. What appear to be merely instrumental choices are better seen as choices about the form of social and political life a society builds, choices about the kinds of people we want to become. Plato's metaphor, especially his reference to the shipwright, is one that an age of high technology ought to ponder carefully: we ought to layout the keels of our vessels with due consideration to what means or manner of life best serves our purpose in our voyage over the sea of time. The vessels that matter now are such things as communications systems, transit systems, energy supply and distribution systems, information networks, household instruments, biomedical technologies, and of course systems of industrial and agricultural production. Just as Plato and Aristotle posed the question, What is the best form of political society? so also an age of high technology ought to ask, What forms of technology are compatible with the kind of society we want to build?

Answers to that question often appear as subliminal themes or concealed agendas in policy discussions that seem to be about productivity, efficiency, and economic growth. A perfect set of examples can be found among the dozens of sophisticated energy studies conducted during the 1970s in response to what was then called "the energy crisis." A careful reader can survey the various reports and interpret the political and social structures their analyses and recommendations imply. 14 Would it be nuclear power administered by a benign priesthood of scientists? Would it be coal and oil brought to you by large, multinational corporations? Would it be synthetic fuels subsidized and administered by the state? Or would it be the soft energy path brought to you by you and your neighbors?

Whatever one's position might be, the prevailing consensus required that all parties base their arguments on a familiar premise: efficiency. Regardless of how a particular energy solution would affect the distribution of wealth and social power, the case for or against it had to be stated as a practical necessity deriving from demonstrable conditions of technical or economic efficiency. As the Ford Foundation's Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group explained: "When analyzing energy, one must first decide whether ordinary rules of economics can be applied." The group decided that, yes, energy should be considered "an economic variable, rather than something requiring special analysis." 15 After that decision had been made, of course, the rest was simply a matter of putting Btus or kilowatt-hours in the numerator and dollars in the denominator and worshipping the resulting ratio as gospel.

Even those who held unorthodox viewpoints in this debate found it necessary to uphold the supreme importance ofthis criterion. Thus, Amory B. Lovins, a leading proponent ofsoft energy paths, wrote of his method: "While not under the illusion that facts are separable from values, I have tried ... to separate my personal preferences from my analytic assumptions and to rely not on modes of discourse that might be viewed as overtly ideological, but rather on classicial arguments of economic and engineering efficiency (which are only tacitly ideological)." 16 To Lovins's credit, he consistently argued that the social consequences of energy choices were, in the last analysis, the most important aspect of energy policy making. In his widely read Soft Energy Paths, Lovins called attention to "centrism, vulnerability, technocracy, repression, alienation" and other grave problems that·afflict conventional energy solutions. Lovins compares "two energy paths that are distinguished by their antithetical social implications." He notes that basing energy decisions on social criteria may appear to involve a "heroic decision," that is, "doing something the more expensive way because it is desirable on other more important grounds than internal cost." But Lovins is careful not to appeal to his readers' sense of courage or altruism. "Surprisingly," he writes, "a heroic deci- sion does not seem to be necessary in this case, because the energy system that seems socially more attractive is also cheaper and easier." 17 But what if the analysis had shown the contrary?

Would Lovins have been prepared to give up the social advantages believed to exist along the soft energy path? Would he have accepted "centrism, vulnerability, technocracy, repression, alienation," and the like? Here Lovins yielded ground that in recent history has again and again been abandoned as lost territory. It raises the question of whether even the best intentioned, best qualified analysts in technological decision making are anything more than mere efficiency worshippers. Much the same strategy often appears in the arguments of those who favor democratic self-management, decentralization, and human-scale technology. As Paul Goodman once noted, "Now, if lecturing at a college, I happen to mention that some function of society which is highly centralized could be much decentralized without loss of efficiency, or perhaps with a gain in efficiency, at once the students want to talk about nothing else." 18 That approach is, indeed, one way of catching people's attention; if you can get away with it, it is certainly a most convincing kind of argument. Because the idea of efficiency attracts a wide consensus, it is sometimes used as a conceptual Trojan horse by those who have more challenging political agendas they hope to smuggle in. But victories won in this way are in other respects great losses. For they affirm in our words and in our methodologies that there are certain human ends that no longer dare be spoken in public. Lingering in that stuffy Trojan horse too long, even soldiers of virtue eventually suffocate.

#### This primacy of technique turns the case and causes extinction

**WILKINSON 1964** (John, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, forward to The Technological Society by Jacques Ellul)

It should not be imagined, however, that the universal concentration camp which Ellus thinks is coming into being in all technical societies without exception will be felt as harsh or restrictive by its inmates. Hitler’s concentration camps of hobnailed boots were symptoms of a deficient political technique. The denizen of the technological state of the future will have everything his heart ever desired, except, of course, his freedom. Admittedly, modern man, forced by technique to become in reality and without residue the imaginary producer-consumer of the classical economists, shows disconcertingly little regard for his lost freedom; but, according to Ellul, there are ominous signs that human spontaneity, which in the rational and ordered technical society has no expression except madness, is only too capable of outbreaks of irrational suicidal destructiveness.

The escape valves of modern literature and art, which technique has contrived, may or may not turn out to be adequate to the harmless release of the pent-up “ecstatic” energies of the human being. Technique, which can in principle only oppose technical and quantitative solutions to technical problems, must, in such a case, seek out other technical safety valves. It could, for example, convince men that they were happy and contented by means of drugs, even though they were visibly suffering from the worst kind of spiritual and material privation. It is obvious that all such ultimate technical measures must cause the last meager “idealistic” motifs of the whole technical enterprise to disappear. Ellul does not specifically say so, but it seems that he must hold that the technological society, like everything else, bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction.

It must not be imagined that the autonomous technique envisioned by Ellul is a kind of “technological determinism,” to use a phrase of Veblen. It may sometimes seem so, but only because all human institutions, like the motions of all physical bodies, have a certain permanence, or vis inertiae, which makes it highly probably that the near future of statistical aggregations will see them continue more or less in the path of the immediate past. Things could have eventuated in the technological society otherwise than they have.

Technique, to Ellul, is a “blind” force, but one which unfortunately seems to be more perspicacious than the best discernible human intelligences. There are other ways out, Ellul maintains, but nobody wants any part of them.

Ellul’s insistence that the technical phenomenon is not a determinism is not weakened by the enumeration (in the second chapter) of five conditions which are said to be “necessary and sufficient” for its outburst in the recent past, since the sufficient conditions for the conditions (for example, the causes of the population explosion) are not ascertainable.

The inertia of the technical phenomenon guarantees not only the continued refinement and production of relatively beneficial articles such as flush toilets and wonder drugs, but also the emergence of those unpredictable secondary effects which are always the result of ecological meddling and which today are of such magnitude and acceleration that they can scarcely be reconciled with even semistable equilibrium conditions of society. Nuclear explosions and population explosions capture the public’s imagination; but I have argued that Ellul’s analysis demands that all indices of modern technological culture are exploding, too, and are potentially just as dangerous to the continued well-being of society, if by well-being we understand social equilibrium.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC- only this iconoclastic rejection of the ‘technique’ opens up a space for truly reasonable debate

**KOWALSKI AND HALUZA-DE LAY 2011** (Nathan, St. Joseph’s College; Randolph, King’s University College, “Homo Energeticus: An Ellulian Analysis of the Alberta Tar Sands,” Dec 17, http://www.academia.edu/1216875/Homo\_energeticus\_Jacques\_Ellul\_on\_the\_Alberta\_Oilsands)

Kevin Garrison summarizes thus: modern techno-logic is “a continual move toward rationalizing all aspects of human life, placing those aspects within a technical sphere, and destroying all possibilities for thinking or acting outside that sphere” (2010, p. 197). Thus, inBourdieu’s terms, technique is what the entire social system takes for granted as the conditions of practical action (“ doxa ”), the universe of the undiscussed and undisputed (Bourdieu, 1977, p.168).Whenever the technical system seems to be flawed or disagreeable in some manner, the only conceivable option is to view these problems as technical problems that technical progress will eventually solve. 3 Faith in future technology as a salvific force reinforces the prior conviction that technology is sacrosanct and cannot be in any way dispensed with. Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands are presented as untouchable and therefore may only becorrected by further technical remediation. It is in this way that Ellul’s theory of techniqueamounts to the (in)famous claim that technology is autonomous . Ellul’s sociological analyses exhibit a tension between the way the society actually is, the way it wants to be, and the way itwill be if current trajectories are maintained. Our claim is that the Alberta tar sands are sold to Albertan society in terms of inevitability and irresistibility, when this is, in fact, not true.

In the end, the point of Ellul’s analysis is that techno-logic is an idea of our own thatnevertheless controls us. Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands impose demands on societythat are accepted by both Albertan voters and the politicians that reiterate those demands, and thus their development is carried out as if we had no choice in the matter. In the end, however, Ellul is not the pessimist he is made out to be by critics. In spite of places where he decries atechnological tyranny, Ellul’s theological writings develop the hope that he has in the face of his sociology of technology. Put simply, he declares “we must destroy the deified religious character of technique” (Ellul 1981?, p. 89). Borrowing from his Christian background, he advocates the iconoclastic desacralization of the falsely sacrosanct technical phenomenon. But such“[i]conoclasm is possible only to the extent that one is able to give up the religious assurances of one’s culture” (Vanderburg, in Ellul, 2004, p. 129), and only if those religious assurances are notalready built into the architecture and geography of our social environment (cf. Huber 2009, p.474). Our contention is that the Alberta tar sands should be exposed as false gods, and only after such desacralization can truly reasonable debate take place as to how their development might proceed.

## The Block – the K

### Framework

#### The way in which we describe policies should be evaluated prior to the results– this does not mean they can’t weigh impacts, rather that our kritik is a prior question– this is the most logical and is vital for policymaking

**Neta Crawford, 2002**. PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Professor of Political Science @ Brown. Argument and Change in World Politics, p. 19-21.

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

#### The more specific the education, the shorter its shelf-life –focus on framing questions

**ECHEVARR 2005** (Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II is the Director of Research and Director of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, US ArmyWar College, Parameters, Summer)

Accordingly, history faces stiff competition for curriculum space from other disciplines—the political and behavioral sciences, for instance—all of which claim (more or less dubiously) to be more relevant to the task of preparing military leaders to address contemporary challenges. The issue of relevance, for instance, while a favorite criterion of curriculum developers, is often overplayed. As a general rule, the greater the relevance of any particular knowledge, the shorter its shelf-life. Moreover, the problems that plague history and allow it to be abused are essentially epistemological in nature, and thus afflict the political and behavioral sciences as well.2 Therefore, while this article focuses on the troubles underlying history, it should not be construed as an argument for replacing history with another equally troubled discipline. On the contrary, despite the faults that will be discussed here, history has much to offer. But not in the way traditionally thought.

#### Policy education from debate is unrealistic – therefore unpredictable and useless

**CLAUDE 1988** (Inis, Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, States and the Global System, pages 18-20)

This view of the state as an institutional monolith is fostered by the notion of sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding over his kingdom. Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of command and its capacity to speak with one voice. Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists. One all too easily conjures up the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve, adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political scientists’ emphasis upon the concept of policy and upon the thesis that governments derive policy from calculations of national interest. We thus take it for granted that states act internationally in accordance with rationally conceived and consciously constructed schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to policy-directed behaviour may have importance–alternatives such as random, reactive, instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour. Our rationalistic assumption that states do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by academic neglect of the execution of policy. We seem to assume that once the state has calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism of the state. I am inclined to call this the Genesis theory of public administration, taking as my text the passage: ‘And God said, Let there be light: and there was light’. I suspect that, in the realm of government, policy execution rarely follows so promptly and inexorably from policy statement. Alternatively, one may dub it the Pooh-Bah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilbert’s Japan who took the position that when the Mikado ordered that something e done it was as good as done and might as well be declared to have been done. In the real world, that which a state decides to do is not as good as done; it may, in fact, never be done. And what states do, they may never have decided to do. Governments are not automatic machines, grinding out decisions and converting decisions into actions. They are agglomerations of human beings, like the rest of us inclined to be fallible, lazy, forgetful, indecisive, resistant to discipline and authority, and likely to fail to get the word or to heed it. As in other large organizations, left and right governmental hands are frequently ignorant of each other’s activities, official spokesmen contradict each other, ministries work at cross purposes, and the creaking machinery of government often gives the impression that no one is really in charge. I hope that no one will attribute my jaundiced view of government merely to the fact that I am an American–one, that is, whose personal experience is limited to a governmental system that is notoriously complex, disjointed, erratic, cumbersome and unpredictable. The United States does not, I suspect, have the least effective government or the most bumbling and incompetent bureaucracy in all the world. Here and there, now and then, governments do, of course perform prodigious feats of organization and administration: an extraordinary war effort, a flight to the moon, a successful hostage-rescue operation. More often, states have to make do with governments that are not notably clear about their purposes or coordinated and disciplined in their operations. This means that, in international relations, states are sometimes less dangerous, and sometimes less reliable, than one might think. Neither their threats nor their promises are to be taken with absolute seriousness. Above all, it means that we students of international politics must be cautious in attributing purposefulness and responsibility to governments. To say the that the United States was informed about an event is not to establish that the president acted in the light of that knowledge; he may never have heard about it. To say that a Soviet pilot shot down an airliner is not to prove that the Kremlin has adopted the policy of destroying all intruders into Soviet airspace; one wants to know how and by whom the decision to fire was made. To observe that the representative of Zimbabwe voted in favour of a particular resolution in the United Nations General Assembly is not necessarily to discover the nature of Zimbabwe’s policy on the affected matter; Zimbabwe may have no policy on that matter, and it may be that no one in the national capital has ever heard of the issue. We can hardly dispense with the convenient notion that Pakistan claims, Cuba promises, and Italy insists, and we cannot well abandon the formal position that governments speak for and act on behalf of their states, but it is essential that we bear constantly in mind the reality that governments are never fully in charge and never achieve the unity, purposefulness and discipline that theory attributes to them–and that they sometimes claim.

#### Identifying with the state scapegoats it for violence which allows evil to continue

**Shaffer 2007** [Butler teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law. B.S., Law, 1958, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; B.A., Political Science, 1959, and J.D., 1961, University of Chicago; Member, Colorado and Nebraska State Bars. “Identifying With the State” June 29th 2007. <http://www.lewrockwell.com/shaffer/shaffer159.html>]

One of the deadliest practices we engage in is that of identifying ourselves with a collective entity. Whether it be the state, a nationality, our race or gender, or any other abstraction, we introduce division – hence, conflict – into our lives as we separate ourselves from those who identify with other groupings. If one observes the state of our world today, this is the pattern that underlies our deadly and destructive social behavior. This mindset was no better articulated than when George W. Bush declared “you’re either with us, or against us.” Through years of careful conditioning, we learn to think of ourselves in terms of agencies and/or abstractions external to our independent being. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to internalize these external forces; to conform our thinking and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities. We adorn ourselves with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective. In this way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, institutions take over the direction of our minds, twisting, squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become “institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense. Once we identify ourselves with the state, that collective entity does more than represent who we are; it is who we are. To the politicized mind, the idea that “we are the government” has real meaning, not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but in the psychological sense. The successes and failures of the state become the subject’s successes and failures; insults or other attacks upon their abstract sense of being – such as the burning of “their” flag – become assaults upon their very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his revealing post-World War II book, [They Thought They Were Free](http://www.amazon.com/They-Thought-Were-Free-Germans/dp/0226511928/lewrockwell/), most Germans were unable to admit that the Nazi regime had been tyrannical. It is this dynamic that makes it easy for political officials to generate wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state. It also helps to explain why most Americans – though tiring of the war against Iraq – refuse to condemn government leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being. The truthfulness of the state’s rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim does not matter – except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran – with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its ends – reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval. The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., [Flying Tigers](http://www.amazon.com/Flying-Tigers-John-Wayne/dp/0782011276/lewrockwell/)) extolled the heroism of American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not. It is not the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. Without most of us standing behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible. What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic. Only when our ego-identities become wrapped up with some institutional abstraction – such as the state – can we be persuaded to invest our lives and the lives of our children in the collective madness of state action. We do not have such attitudes toward organizations with which we have more transitory relationships. If we find an accounting error in our bank statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.” One of the many adverse consequences of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions is our loss of control over not only the meaning and direction in our lives, but of the manner in which we can be efficacious in our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us. We become dependent upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world – such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us. As the costs and failures of the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the practices employed by the state to get us to mobilize our “dark side” energies in opposition to the endless recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of psychological projection. Whether we care to acknowledge it or not – and most of us do not – each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence – even deadly – against others; or that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to eliminate. The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by subconsciously projecting these traits onto others (i.e., “scapegoats”) and punishing them for what are really our own shortcomings. The state has trained us to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest our lives, resources, and other energies in pursuit of the enemy du jour. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics class mantra about the necessity for government – and the bigger the government the better – we begin to experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-burgeoning state bureaucracies. Having grown weary of the costs – including the loss of control over our lives – we blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. The statists have helped us accept a world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage the lives of billions of people – along with the planet upon which we live! – and we are now experiencing the costs generated by our own gullibility. We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who, having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves. We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one’s life can be separated from the responsibilities for one’s actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against the proposition. By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) we give up the integrated life, the sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us. While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us. The statists have – as was their vicious purpose – simply taken over the territory we have abandoned. Our politico-centric pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed external forces to move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being. The only way out of our dilemma involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. We require nothing so much right now as the development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us – without division and conflict – to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.

### A2:: Energy good

#### There’s no such thing as “good technology” without first determining what constitutes the good—we don’t reject energy – we think their framing of the energy debate is a flawed starting point – beginning with critique doesn’t preclude intervention

**WINNER 1989** (Prof of Poli Sci at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, The Whale and the Reactor)

For anyone who had followed the rise ofthe appropriate technology movement during the middle 1970s, the ad had an ominous ring. Would the quest for ecologically sound, small-scale, humane technologies turn out to be a mere fad? Corrupted by Madison Avenue, commercialization, and bureaucratic cooptation, movements for social change in late twentieth-century America have often ended up as fashion trends. In a matter of weeks the radical thrust of a new idea can be absorbed into the glossy, ephemeral surfaces of the postindustrial marketplace. Would appropriate technology meet the same dreary fate? The notion of an "appropriate," "intermediate," or "alternative" technology was first proposed in the mid-1960s as a way of addressing the economic, technical, and social problems of Third World countries. British economist E. F. Schumacher and others with similar views tried to develop methods ofeconomic improvement in harmony with the existing conditions of traditional societies. Technical development would take heed of the skill levels of a population, natural resources available indigenously, and pressing social needs defined by the people themselves. Rather than introduce the biggest and best technologies of Western industrialized countries, the idea was to devise a collection of small-scale agricultural and industrial techniques, for example, Schumacher's one-person egg carton factory, that would solve immediate problems without causing serious cultural disruption. 1

Beginning in the early 1970s the concept of appropriate technology was applied to the problems of advanced industrial societies as well. Social activists argued that pollution, environmental damage, spiraling energy costs, resource depletion, alienation, and other gnawing social ills could be remedied if the right kinds oftechnology were widely used. "Wisdom demands a new orientation of science and technology towards the organic, the gentle, the non-violent, the elegant and beautiful," Schumacher argued in Small is Beautiful, one ofthe most widely read books of social philosophy of the decade. 2 A number of organizations took up.the challenge, seeking to overcome the destructive practices of modern civilization. The New Alchemy Institute, Farallones Institute, Intermediate Technology Devel~pment Group, countless solar energy companies, and ecologically oriented research institutes in the United States, Canada, and Europe set about exploring a variety of technological alternatives. 3 In California Governor Jerry Brown embraced the idea as a keynote in his program for change and created an Office of Appropriate Technology to promote "AT" in the state. During the presidency ofJimmy Carter a number ofagencies ofthe federal government paid at least some attention to the idea. For a time, Carter's antipoverty agency, Action, featured "appropriate technology" and "self-sufficiency" slogans in its programs to help the poor. At the urging of Senator Michael Mansfield, federal funds were allotted to found a National Center for Appropriate Technology located in Butte, Montana.

Little noticed in all the ferment was a basic conceptual problem. Any notion of "appropriate" technology is meaningless until one answers the question, Appropriate to what? As applied to the Third World, the answer was clear enough; judgments about appropriateness would come from specific cultural and environmental settings. Agricultural production techniques well suited to one country might not be desirable in another; each society would have to determine what means are appropriate to its needs. As applied to Western industrial societies, however, the idea had a much different significance. After all, these were societies whose dominant cultural norms had led them astray. If "appropriate technology" was to have any significance at all, it would have to challenge these norms and suggest new ones. But where would this new understanding be found? And how would it persuade those already committed to orthodox forms of technical and economic practice?

#### Adapting humans to technology results in inequality, dehumanization, and the eclipse of culture

**ELLUL 1989** (Jacques, French sociologist and philosopher but not like totally mainstream like the other ones, What I Believe, Trans. Bromiley, http://www.jesusradicals.com/wp-content/uploads/what.pdf)

Thus one of the great themes today is technological culture. We are supposedly adding technological knowledge to our humanist legacy. At least this is not an attempt to raise technology to the rank of a true culture, to find in it a source of values, intelligence, a critical spirit, a universalism. A technological culture is in fact impossible, for technology is the negation of culture. We find a similar desire to show that technology becomes social inasmuch as it simplifies and amplifies social actions, or that it creates a new art. This is merely playing with words; there is no substance to it. The art created by painters, sculptors, and musicians imitates what technology alone proposes and permits and has nothing in common with what has been produced as art, and called such up to about 1930, since Prehistoric times.2 People are always talking about humanizing technology, but this talk has no effect whatever on its development. All questioning of technology on basic grounds (e.g, by ecology and the ecological movement in its early days) has either been ruthlessly dismissed or integrated into the technological world. This world sometimes seems capable of producing a counterforce, for in the period of transition from one environment to another susceptibilities have to be taken into account. Thus we find the concern for human relations in the 1950s and the movement of technology assessment today. But these simply serve to allay disquiet and thus to make development easier.

The second result of the domination of this environment is that human beings have to adapt to it and accept total change. At issue here is not just a slight modification or adaptation but an essential transformation. A first aspect of this radical adaptation concerns the relation between human beings and machines. If machines have to be perfectly adapted to us, the reverse is unavoidable. We have to be exactly what is useful for machines, their perfect complement. Human life is no longer merely a matter of muscle and reflex. We now have to have our gadgets. We can see the mutation very clearly and decisively in the academic world. The humanities are now disparaged. Traditional culture is valueless relative to machines. At the beginning of the 20th century, and again in 1930, people in the industrial and commercial world began to ask what good such studies as history and Greek are. How can they help us to make money or to forge ahead economically? Today we are putting much the same question, but in a new way: How do they serve the technological world? How do they make us a proper complement for machines? This is why there is such an incredible stress on information in our schools. The important thing is to prepare young people to enter the world of information, able to handle computers, but knowing only the reasoning, the language, the combinations, and the connections between computers. This movement is invading the whole intellectual domain and also that of conscience.

But this is not the only feature. Part of the human mutation is the appearance and consecration of the human guinea pig in furtherance of science and technology. Since science and technology are plainly dominant, we have to test their effects and usefulness on people. Experiments are becoming ever more numerous and varied. I was horrified many years ago to learn that in the United States, for scientific reasons (to study the evolution of the embryo), pregnant women were being paid to have an abortion at a given stage, and we have gone much further than that today. Remedies, pharmaceutical products, are being tested on people for pay. There is experimentation in the field of what is everywhere called genetic makeup. We are growing used to the idea that people are simply guinea pigs upon whom it is quite legitimate to conduct scientific experiments. "Humanity is our most precious resource" is a slogan that has been taken up in many forms the last few years. But let us remember that if humanity is only a resource, this implies that we may treat humanity as simply a factor in economic production. Leases are taken out on resources. In the genetic field there seems to be no limit to what can be done (implants, test-tube babies, surrogate mothers, etc.). The imagination has free rein. But genetic manipulation is designed to produce exactly the type of people that we need. Much has been made of the book 1984, but what is in prospect is really Huxley's Brave New World. From birth individuals are to be adapted specially to perform various services in society. They are to be so perfectly adapted physiologically that there will be no maladjustment, no revolt, no looking elsewhere. The combination of genetic makeup and educational specialization will make people adequate to fulfill their technological functions.

Beyond that, American experiments directly on the brain have shown that the implantation of minute electrodes (with the consent of the subject) might induce specific impressions, desires, and pleasures, and effect obedience to orders no matter who gives them and with no need for speech. At an experimental stage this has caused no scandal. But is it not apparent that this new form of intervention in human nature will finally suppress human freedom altogether, will bring about complete obedience without choice, and will result in the perfect adaptation that technology needs? People will no longer be a hindrance to proper conduct. The more perfect technology becomes, the more refined and complex and subtle and swift its processes, the more human conduct has to be perfect. We can no longer dream or forget or have other centers of interest. An instrument panel in an automated factory is no place for the recalling of poetry. The technological environment demands a radical transformation of humanity. Previously human adaptation followed the slow rhythm of evolution from generation to generation. Only over centuries did people become social, political, and urban. No one decided for them that they had to follow this pattern. Today the technological environment is coming upon us very quickly. Technology develops with ever increasing speed. In every sector and in all directions the new environment is being formed explosively. Hence human adaptation to it cannot be extended over many centuries. We have to adjust rapidly.

Examination of the last thirty years will be enough to demonstrate this incredible rapidity. Technology cannot wait, for it soon becomes unusable. Everything has to be done in a single generation. Nor can the adaptation be spontaneous, following our physiological and intellectual rhythm. To move quickly, we have to move by act of will. We cannot wait for progressive and cumulative adaptations. We have to create at once the kind of people that machines demand. Human language has already been modified to become that of the computer. Some numbers and letters have been modified so as to correspond exactly to the form that the computer gives them. This is an almost unrecognizable occurrence, yet it is of major importance.

A problem arises, however. For a long time those who have been genetically manipulated so as to conform to the technological model will be a small minority. Most people will still be at the social stage or even the natural stage. What will be the relations between these groups? They will certainly not understand one another. There will be no more in common between them than in the transition from the first to the second stage there was between nomadic brigands and the first city merchants five thousand years ago. On the one hand there will be a kind of aristocracy marked off by its total and infallible adaptation to technical gadgets and the technological system, and on the other hand there will be a vast number of people who are outdated, who cannot use the technology, who are powerless, who are still at the social stage but who live in a technological environment for which they are totally unadapted.

In this respect I must make a final observation. When I talk about adaptation, readers might think that I mean adjustment to various minor differences in environment. Thus people in hot countries adjust their clothes and habits and customs accordingly. But the changes of environment that I have in mind demand a total and fundamental mutation, so that I am inclined to say that the Prehistoric people of the natural environment had nothing in common with the historical people of the social environment, and that we are now witnessing a mutation of the same order. We have only to think how alien the bushmen or aborigines of Australia were to all that the 19th century regarded as human nature. By a change of environment what is regarded as human nature in one epoch is transformed and a new model of humanity emerges. It might be argued that I am exaggerating and that the environment cannot have this impact on human nature. But that argument is a mere hypothesis based on the conviction that there is such a thing as an inalienable and basically identical human nature. For my part, I am not so sure. Furthermore, no one has ever been able to say clearly what this human nature really is.

Nevertheless, I have still to answer a question of my own. Why have I given this sketch of the development of three environments in a book entitled What I Believe? It is true that at a first glance all that I have written here seems to have nothing to do with my fundamental beliefs, with what is fundamentally existential for me. Yet at root what I have presented is not a scientific theory. I cannot prove the impact of the environment or the relation of human beings to it. I do not pretend to be able to give strict answers to the many questions that. confront anthropologists, ethnologists, and historians. I have put forward a simple hypothesis. But all hypotheses include a great deal of intuition and belief. Conversely, all beliefs finally express themselves in hypotheses which will be more or less strict and more or less daring, but which we have to take into account if we are to get the complete picture of an epoch. I would say in fact that this relation of human beings to their environment and these changes of environment do form part of what I believe. And if some disappointed readers are tempted to say: "And is this all that Jacques Ellul believes?" I would reply that what is at issue here is evaluating the danger of what might happen to our humanity in the present half-century, and distinguishing between what we want to keep and what we are ready to lose, between what we can welcome as legitimate human development and what we should reject with our last ounce of strength as dehumanization. I cannot think that choices of this kind are unimportant. What I believe with this theory of three environments has to do very definitely with the need to formulate what kind of humanity we want and what kind we repudiate. The relevance of this aspect of what I believe is by no means negligible.

### A2:: Case outweighs

#### Their “case outweighs” argument frames impacts in terms of risk which benefits conservative interests and maintains the social hegemony of technique

**WINNER 1989** (Prof of Poli Sci at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, The Whale and the Reactor)

But from the point of view I've described here, the risk debate is one that certain kinds of social interests can expect to lose by the very act of entering. In our times, under most circumstances in which the matter is likely to come up, deliberations about risk are bound to have a strongly conservative drift. The conservatism to which I refer is one that upholds the status quo of production and consumption in our industrial, marketoriented society, a status quo supported by a long history of economic development in which countless new technological applications were introduced with scant regard to the possibility that they might cause harm. Thus, decades of haphazard use of industrial chemicals provide a background of expectations for today's deliberations on the safety of such chemicals. Pollution of the air, land, and water are not the exception in much of twentieth-century America, but rather the norm. Because industrial practices acceptable in the past have become yardsticks for thinking about what will be acceptable now and in the future, attempts to achieve a cleaner, healthier environment face an uphill battle. The burden of proof rests upon those who seek to change long-existing patterns. In this context, to define the subject of one's concerns as a "risk" rather than select some other issue skews the subsequent discussion in a particular direction. This choice makes it relatively easy to defend practices associated with high levels of industrial production; at the same time it makes it much more difficult for those who would like to place moral or political limits upon that production to make much headway. I am not saying that this is a consequence of the way risk assessment is "used," although conservative uses ofthis sort ofanalysis are, as we have seen, easily enough concocted. What is more important to recognize is that in a society like ours discussions centering on risk have an inherent tendency to shape the texture of such inquiries and their outcome as well. The root of this tendency lies, very simply, in the way the concept of "risk" is employed in everyday language. As I have noted, employing this word to talk about any situation declares our willingness to compare expected gain with possible harm. We generally do not define a practice as a risk unless there is an anticipated advantage somehow associated with that practice. In contrast, this disposition to weigh and compare is not invoked by concepts that might be employed as alternatives to "risk"- "danger," "peril," "hazard," and "threat." Such terms do not presuppose that the source of possible injury is also a source of benefits. From the outset, then, those who might wish to propose limits upon any particular industrial or technological application are placed at a disadvantage by selecting "risk" as the focus of their concerns. As they adopt risk assessment as a legitimate activity, they tacitly accept assumptions they might otherwise wish to deny (or at least puzzle over): that the object or practice that worries them must be judged in light of some good it brings and that they themselves are recipients of at least some portion of this good. Once the basic stance and disposition associated with "risk" have defined the field of discourse, all the complications and invidious comparisons I have described begin to enter in. Standards of scientific certainty are applied to the available data to show how little we know about the relationship of cause and effect as regards particular industrial practices and their broader consequences. Methods of risk/cost/benefit analysis fill out a detailed economic balance sheet useful in deciding how much risk is "acceptable." Statistical analyses show the comparative probability of various kinds ofunfortunate events, for example, being injured in a skiing accident as compared to being injured by a nuclear power plant meltdown. Psychological studies reveal peculiarities in the ways people estimate and compare various kinds of risks. Models from social science instruct us about the relationship of institutional structures to particular objects of fear. A vast, intricately specialized division of intellectual labor spreads itself before us. One path through this mass of issues is to take each one separately, seeking to determine which standards, methods, findings, and models are appropriate to making sound judgments about problems that involve public health, safety, and environmental quality. For example, one might question how reasonable it is to apply the very strict standards of certainty used in scientific research to questions that have a strong social or moral component. Must our judgments on possible harms and the origins of those harms have only a five percent chance of being wrong? Doesn't the use ofthat significance level mean that possibly dangerous practices are "innocent until proven guilty"? 17 Similarly, one might reevaluate the role that cost/benefit analysis plays in the assessment ofrisks, pointing to the strengths and shortcomings ofthat method. How well are we able to measure the mix of "costs" and "benefits" involved in a given choice? What shall we do when faced with the inadequacy of our measurements? Are criteria of efficiency derived from economic theories sufficient to guide value choices in public policy? In controversies about the status of the intellectual tools used in decision making, such questions are hotly disputed. 18 But for those who see issues of public health, safety, and environmental quality as fairly straightforward matters requiring urgent action, these exercises in methodological refinement are of dubious value. It is sensible to ask, Why get stuck in such perplexities at all? Should we spend our time working to improve techniques ofrisk analysis and risk assessment? Or should we spend the same time working more directly to find better ways to secure a beautiful, healthy, well-provided world and to eliminate the spread of harmful residues of industrial life? The experience of environmentalists and consumer advocates who enter the risk debate will resemble that ofa greenhorn who visits Las Vegas and is enticed into a poker game in which the cards are stacked against him. Such players will be asked to wager things very precious to them with little prospect that the gamble will deliver favorable returns. To learn that the stacked deck comes as happenstance rather than by conscious design provides little solace; neither will it be especially comforting to discover that hard work and ingenuity might improve the odds somewhat. For some, it is simply not the right game to enter. There are some players at the table, however, who stand a much better chance. Proponents of relaxed government regulations on nuclear power, industrial pollution, occupational safety and health, environmental protection, and the like will find risk assessment, insofar as they are able to interest others in it, a very fruitful contest. Hence, Chauncey Starr, engineer and advocate of nuclear power, is well advised to take "risk" as the central theme in his repertoire of argument. But the likes of David Brower, Ralph Nader, and other advocates ofconsumer and environmental interests would do well to think twice before allowing the concept to play an important role in their positions on public issues.